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Abstract 
A stronger middle class is important for the economic and political future of both cities 
and nations. Analyses focusing on the size of the middle class can be misleading, 
providing information on income inequality or temporary economic conditions. More 
important than the size of the middle class is the quality of life of the middle class. Higher 
education can serve students from middle-class backgrounds, helping them sustain a 
middle-class standard of living and rise up the economic ladder, as well as providing “on 
ramps” to the middle class for those from low-income backgrounds. We show that 
middle class wage earners bore the brunt of the Great Recession in Las Vegas. Using a 
new metric of mobility based on data from Opportunity Insights (formerly the Equality 
of Opportunity Project), we also examine the contribution of colleges in the Mountain 
West to serving and strengthening the middle class.  
 
Introduction 
The quality of life of the middle class is a vitally important economic, social, and political 
issue. In recent decades, middle-class families have seen slower income growth than 
those above and below them. Wages have grown painfully slowly for less-educated 
women1, and have fallen for less-educated men. 
The desire to secure and sustain a middle-class standard of living is virtually universal. 
But the opportunity to do so is not. Place matters. In some cities, the middle class is 
thriving, and low-income children are rising up to join its ranks. In others, the middle 
class is sliding (even shrinking, on some measures), and upward mobility rates are low. 
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Education is key, providing, at its best, a strong boost to the chances for individuals to 
move up the economic ladder, as well as the skills required for flourishing local labor 
markets. While our focus here is on the Mountain West, the implications of our analysis 
of middle-class size at the metro level, and the “middle-class-making” capacity of local 
colleges, have broader applicability.  
 
Is the Las Vegas Middle Class Shrinking? 
In recent years, there has been growing concern about the size of the middle class. This is 
not just a U.S. anxiety; a recent report from the OECD2 reported that the middle class is 
shrinking in most member nations. 
But the middle class can only change size if it is defined in a certain way. It can also change 
size for radically different reasons—because more (or fewer) people are rich, or because 
more (or fewer) people are poor. Prognostications on the size of the middle class can 
therefore be misleading and should be treated with caution.  
One definition popularized (in the U.S.) by the Pew Research Center has generated 
headlines3 about the “shrinking middle class” in Nevada and Las Vegas, for example. Pew 
classifies households as middle class if they earn between two-thirds and twice median 
income. For a household of three in 2017, these thresholds nationally were about $46,000 
and $139,000.4  The share of U.S. households who fall within this range changes along 
with the shape of the income distribution. Pew estimates5 that the share of U.S. adults 
living in middle-income households has fallen sharply, from 61% in 1971 to 52% in 2016.6  
The Future of the Middle Class Initiative at Brookings defines the middle class7 as 
households in the middle 60% of the national income distribution. Under our definition, 
the middle class cannot change in size at the national level, since 60% of U.S. households 
are in the middle class, by definition. But it may grow or shrink in a given metropolitan 
statistical area, or MSA (or any other subnational geographic region). Our range is a little 
lower than Pew’s, including households with incomes between about $31,000 and 
$133,000 for a household of three in 2017.8 
Has the middle class in Las Vegas shrunk? Yes—on Pew’s definition. No—on ours. 
Using Pew’s definition, the share of households in the Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise MSA 
(hereafter referred to as Las Vegas) who are middle class dropped from 57% to 52% 
between 1999 and 2017.9 But according to the Brookings definition, the share of 
households in the middle class remained essentially the same over the same period: 64% 
in 1999, 65% in 2017.10  
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This is a difference worth investigating, not least because of the popular media attention 
such questions generate. Figure 1 shows the distribution of household incomes in the Las 
Vegas MSA in 1999, 2011, and 2017.11  
Figure 1 
Shifts in the Las Vegas Income Distribution 
 
The income distribution of Las Vegas shifted to the left between 1999 and 2011, as 
median income in Las Vegas declined sharply, from about $73,000 to $60,000 for a 
household of three.12 Median income was actually slightly greater in Las Vegas than in 
the U.S. as a whole in 1999 but fell below the national median during the Great Recession. 
Incomes have subsequently shifted back in a more positive direction but have not yet 
returned to pre-recession levels. 
Since income fell more in Las Vegas than nationally, a greater share of households 
qualified as “low-income”—i.e. below the threshold for the middle class—in 2011 than in 
1999, under both the Brookings definition (under the 20th percentile of the national 
distribution) and Pew definition (under 67% of the national median). 
The distribution has since shifted slightly back toward its 1999 position, as median income 
in Las Vegas rose to $65,000 in 2017. Between 2011 and 2017, the size of the middle class 
increased by a little under two percentage points under both definitions (though there 
has been substantial noise between those years).13 Table 1 shows the share of households 
in Las Vegas who were low-, middle-, or high-income under the Pew and Brookings 
definitions in 1999, 2011, and 2017. 
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Table 1 
Share of Las Vegas Households that are Low-, Middle-, and High-Income  
Under Brookings & Pew Definitions 
 
Brookings Pew 
Low Middle High Low Middle High 
1999 16% 64% 20% 28% 57% 16% 
2011 20% 64% 17% 34% 51% 16% 
2017 19% 65% 16% 34% 52% 14% 
Both definitions show a rise in the share of households that are low-income and a decline 
in the share that are high-income. But the effect on the size of the middle class depends 
on the precise thresholds by which the middle class is defined. Figure 2 shows that the 
Brookings definition (in blue) captures a lower portion of the income distribution than the 
Pew definition (in yellow). As the income distribution in Las Vegas has shifted to the left 
since 1999, some households have “dropped out” of the Pew middle class but remained 
in the Brookings middle class. 
Figure 2 
Middle Class in Las Vegas, 2017 
Share of households in the middle class under two definitions 
 
The takeaway here is that the size of the middle class, however defined, is highly sensitive 
to the selection of arbitrary thresholds. What matters in our view is not quantity (i.e. the 
size of the middle class) but quality—specifically, quality of life. Modest changes in the 
size of the middle class are second-order concerns next to the economic and social 
conditions of the middle class. We turn to this question next. 
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Migration and the Middle Class 
The middle class within a city might also grow or shrink because of migration, rather than 
because of changes in the economic circumstances of the families already there. For 
instance, the share of households who are low-income may increase (and the share who 
are middle class decrease) as a result of an inflow of low-wage workers into the MSA. This 
is a particularly important consideration for Las Vegas, because it had the greatest 
population growth of any of the 100 largest MSAs in the two decades prior to the 
Recession—by 86% in the 1990s and 42% in the 2000s, according to our colleague William 
Frey.14 This means that many of the households living in Las Vegas in 2011 were not living 
in Las Vegas in 1999, the first year of our analysis. 
What impact did this have on incomes in the city? In fact, despite the rapid population 
growth of the early to mid-2000s, the distribution of income in Las Vegas changed very 
little over this period. It was not until the onset of the Great Recession that the share of 
households in the bottom quintile of the national income distribution began to increase, 
and the share in the top quintile to decrease. Frey shows that population growth slowed 
after 2006, largely driven by declining Hispanic migration to Las Vegas as construction 
jobs disappeared. Population growth totaled just 14% between 2010 and 201815—still 
substantial compared to many other MSAs, but much reduced since the boom years of 
the 1990s. Once a very popular destination for those hoping to reach the middle class, 
Las Vegas has struggled to maintain and rebuild middle-wage jobs in the wake of the 
downturn. 
 
The Las Vegas Middle Class: Hit Hard, Still Bruised 
Las Vegas was among the ten metros hit hardest by the Great Recession.16 And the middle 
got hit hardest of all. Figure 3 shows that wage growth in the middle of the distribution 
in Las Vegas and other hard-hit MSAs (and especially in the second and third wage 
quintiles) was much lower than in less-affected areas.  
As such, Las Vegas faces the challenge of rebuilding wages and incomes for middle-class 
families. One of the most important routes to a middle-class income—and likely to be 
become even more important—is post-secondary education. We turn to this next. 
 
  
 
 
 
6 Brookings Mountain West | July 2019 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Middle Wages in Las Vegas Hit Hard by Recession 
 
 
Colleges and Upward Mobility 
Debates on post-secondary education tend to be dominated by the tails—that is, either 
on the importance of colleges for those from poor backgrounds, or on the cost of and 
access to elite institutions, which overwhelming serve students from upper middle class 
(fewer than 2% of young people from the middle 60% of the income distribution actually 
attend elite colleges). The role of colleges in serving students from middle-class 
backgrounds—or helping more to rise into the middle class—is a neglected area of study. 
In their groundbreaking work on the role of colleges in intergenerational mobility, Chetty 
et al. (2017) primarily focus, for example, on bottom-to-top mobility. Their headline 
measure of mobility combines access—the share of students who come from the bottom 
quintile—and success, defined as the share of those students who reach the top quintile. 
This bottom-to-top mobility is very rare, however: the average mobility rate for all the 
colleges in the Chetty et al. (2017) dataset is just 1.7% (i.e. 1.7% of U.S. students move 
from the bottom quintile to the top quintile).  
Figure 4 shows the access and success rates at all colleges in the U.S., highlighting major 
colleges in Las Vegas and elsewhere in the Mountain West.17 The University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas (UNLV) moves 1.9% of its student body from the bottom to top quintile, ranking 
slightly above average. Note that while UNLV’s success rate is nearly identical to that of 
the University of Nevada, Reno (UNR), its overall mobility rate is higher because a greater 
share of its students come from the bottom quintile: 
 
 
 
Brookings Mountain West | July 2019 7 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Bottom to Top Mobility 
 
There is nothing wrong with this mobility measure. It simply emphasizes a Horatio Alger, 
rags-to-riches kind of mobility, from the bottom rung to the top rung. But it does mean 
that very small changes in the measure can move colleges a long way up or down the 
mobility league table. More importantly, it provides no information on how far colleges 
are serving and helping students from middle-class families, or getting poor kids into the 
middle class. This can however be done using the data, since the Chetty team make it 
available to the public.  
Hoxby and Turner (2019)18 additionally criticize this bottom to top quintile measure for 
potentially conflating a school’s effort with its circumstances. They write that “measures 
mean[t] to measure a university’s effort to enroll well-qualified low-income students…can 
largely reflect differences in the pools of students from whom the universities could 
plausibly draw.” This is particularly salient for non-elite schools that tend to draw from 
more local areas rather than from the national student pool. For instance, Hoxby and 
Turner show that schools located in areas with fairly equal income distributions, such as 
Wisconsin, may draw from a pool of primarily middle-class students and relatively few 
low- or high-income students. By contrast, schools in highly unequal areas (e.g. California) 
may have a large pool of low-income students to draw from, and may thus find it easier 
to enroll a greater portion of students from the bottom quintile. Hoxby and Turner 
therefore recommend measuring access for low-income students relative to the number 
of low-income students in the school’s “relevant pool.”19 
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The challenge is to define a school’s relevant pool. Taking Nevada as an example, it is 
highly likely that UNLV draws primarily from the Las Vegas metropolitan area, its home 
city and the most populous region of the state. In 2018, 26,000 out of 30,000 UNLV 
students were from Nevada.20 In this case, if we were to take up the Hoxby and Turner 
challenge, we might want to compare the income distribution of students to the income 
distribution of Las Vegas, illustrated in the previous section. Figure 5 shows the income 
backgrounds of students at UNLV, as well as UNR, and the College of Southern Nevada. 
Figure 5 
Income Distributions of Nevada Colleges 
 
A key question here is whether UNLV and UNR draw from the same geographic area (that 
is, the state of Nevada). If so, then the chart above suggests that UNLV is somewhat more 
accessible to low- and middle-income students than UNR. But if the schools primarily draw 
from more limited local regions, then they may face different student “pools.” 
One simple approach is to look at the income distributions of the area surrounding the 
institution. Chetty supplies information on the income distribution for parents of college-
aged students by commuting zone (similar to MSAs but typically larger, covering the entire 
land area of the United States, whereas MSAs exclude rural areas). About 64% of students 
in the Las Vegas commuting zone come from the middle class, and 17% come from the 
top quintile. In the Reno commuting zone, 79% come from the middle class, and only 8% 
from the top quintile. This suggests that UNR may be even less accessible to middle class 
students, at least locally. But without more data, we do not know with any certainty how 
to define the relevant “pool” from which the college is drawing. 
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Chetty et al. point out that there is almost as much variation in mobility rates for colleges 
within the same commuting zone as between all colleges across the country. This implies 
that the “relevant pool” question raised by Hoxby and Turner is not very consequential. 
We do not adjudicate this argument here, though it is an interesting and potentially 
important one. Instead, we restrict our attention to large public colleges in the Mountain 
West, thereby largely avoiding the issue by comparing schools that draw from at least 
broadly similar pools. We also focus on the middle class (i.e. middle 60% by household 
income), which is a much larger group and so less sensitive to any differences in the local 
income distribution. Most colleges can reach a reasonably large pool of middle-class 
students. 
 
Towards a Middle-Class College Mobility Measure 
Next, we construct a new mobility measures of how far colleges promote mobility into or 
above the middle class. We distinguish between mobility for students from the middle 
class into a higher quintile, and for students from the bottom quintile into the middle 
class.  
First, we need a measure of middle-class access. On the face of it, this is a simple task: 
just measure the fraction of students at a college who come from the middle class. But 
this could end up penalizing schools that take more students from the bottom quintile. 
Imagine two schools that take the same fraction of their students from the bottom 
quintile, but different fractions from the bottom and top quintiles. Say each school moves 
30% of its middle-class students into the top quintile. Because the schools have the same 
middle-class access and success rates, they have equivalent middle-class mobility rates: 
12% of their students come from the middle class and reach the top quintile.21  
Table 2 
Middle Class College Mobility: Standard Access Measure 
This measure would reward a school for reducing the fraction of students who come from 
either the top quintile or the bottom quintile in favor of enrolling more students from the 
middle class. In our view, it would be a mistake to construct a measure of middle-class 
access that penalizes a college for taking a high proportion of its students from low-
income families. To avoid this, we calculate access rates for the middle class compared to 
 Parental Income Distribution  
Bottom 
Quintile 
Middle 
Class 
Top 
Quintile 
Middle-Class 
Success Rate 
Middle-Class 
Mobility Rate 
School 1 10% 40% 50% 30% 12% 
School 2 50% 40% 10% 30% 12% 
 
 
 
10 Brookings Mountain West | July 2019 
 
 
 
 
access rates for the top quintile—in other words, by taking out the bottom quintile 
altogether. The new middle-class access rate is thus the number of students who come 
from the middle class (middle three quintiles) as a share of students from the top four 
quintiles (for more details see the Methodology section).  
Among the students at School 1 and School 2 who do not come from the bottom quintile, 
44% and 80% come from the middle class, respectively. School 2 thus has a higher middle-
class mobility rate: 24% of students from the top four quintiles move from the middle class 
to the top quintile.  
Table 3 
Middle Class College Mobility: New Access Measure 
 Parental Income 
Distribution 
 
Middle Class Top Quintile Middle-Class Success Rate 
Middle-Class 
Mobility Rate 
School 1 44% 56% 30% 13% 
School 2 80% 20% 30% 24% 
Getting students into the top quintile is, of course, not the only way colleges can promote 
mobility or support students. How about a student from a family in the second-poorest 
quintile who moves up to the middle quintile? Even moving up one quintile is progress. 
But if moving up one quintile is good, moving up two, three, or four is even better. 
For some students, just maintaining the same position on the income ladder as their 
parents, rather than sliding down, might count as success. Staying in the same quintile 
may not seem great—but it is better than being downwardly mobile. Ideally, an 
assessment of a college’s performance would take all these differences into account, 
giving more credit for bigger moves up the ladder. 
We adopt a simple approach by calculating college mobility scores based on the average 
number of quintiles moved among students at the college. Big moves up the income 
ladder will pull up the average; downward movements will pull it down. We apply this 
mobility measure to students from the middle 60% (adjusted as described above). Figure 
6 presents the mobility score is on the y-axis and middle-class access is on the x-axis. 
Colleges with positive mobility scores move students up the income distribution, on 
average, while colleges with negative mobility scores move students down the income 
distribution. In many cases, the latter will be true if a college takes relatively more of its 
middle-class students from the fourth quintile, who have little “room” for upward 
mobility (since they can only be upwardly mobile if they reach the top quintile), but more 
room for downward mobility. 
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Figure 6 
Mobility Scores for Students from the Middle 60% 
 
The average number of quintiles moved is low across the whole distribution of colleges: 
the national figure is 0.2. A number of points are worth making here. Relative mobility is 
a zero-sum game; in order for people to move up the ladder, an equivalent number have 
to move down. While those who attend college are less likely to move down than those 
who do not (see chart), they are not immunized entirely against the risk of downward 
relative mobility. The very large numbers now enrolling in college means that there will 
be both upward and downward mobility among college enrollees.  
One more point on interpretation, prompted in part by the striking negative average 
mobility number for Utah State. The adult incomes of the children are measured and 
ranked on an individual basis, rather than in terms of household income. The Chetty data 
also includes individuals who report zero earnings. So if, say, married women file taxes 
jointly with their husbands but are not themselves earning any income, they will have 
zero individual earnings (and by definition, therefore, are in the bottom income quintile).  
Utah State University has the 24th-highest marriage rate of any college in the country. 
Four out of five former students were married in 2014. We can also see that students 
from higher-income families are more likely to be married than students from lower-
income families; about 64% of Utah State students from the bottom quintile are married, 
compared to 82% of those from the fourth and fifth quintiles. 
When Chetty et al. take those with zero earnings out of the sample, median income for 
students at Utah State rises from $30,000 to $42,000, or 39%. It seems almost certain, 
 
 
 
12 Brookings Mountain West | July 2019 
 
 
 
 
then, that the low mobility rates for Utah State, and indeed for other Utah colleges, are 
likely to be generated by the unusually high proportion of zero earners, and that this in 
turn is likely the result of its unusually high marriage rates, and possibly lower rates of 
maternal employment; Brigham Young has an even higher marriage rate and an even 
lower middle-class mobility score. Great care is required in interpretation here. 
Colleges with mobility scores around zero are, on average, largely keeping students in 
place. For the middle class, this is not necessarily a bad outcome. Most community 
colleges, including the College of Southern Nevada,22 take the bulk of their students from 
the middle class and send most of them back into the middle class. The outcomes for 
those who do not attend college are considerably worse.  
How about lifting poor kids into the middle class or higher? We turn next to the mobility 
for students from the bottom quintile. For our measure of success here we have selected 
the proportion rising into the top 60% (i.e. moving up at least two quintiles). This could 
be seen then a measure not just of moving into the middle class, on our broad, middle-
60% definition, but into a more “solidly” middle class position.  
Figure 7 
Mobility into the Middle Class 
 
 
Labor Markets or Colleges? 
It is important to stress that the economic outcomes of students attending a particular 
college reflects a range of factors independent of the college itself. The level of academic 
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readiness of students enrolling at different institutions, even at similar levels of 
selectivity, may vary considerably. The state of the labor market they graduate into will 
vary, too. So while we know that people who do not attend college are almost always less 
upwardly mobile than those who attend almost any college, we do not know if the same 
students would have high rates of upward mobility if they enrolled in, say, Colorado State. 
Low- and middle-income students who attend Colorado State likely differ in other ways 
from those who do not attend college—or, for that matter, from those who attend the 
College of Southern Nevada. 
Colleges may benefit from a location in a strong labor market where many middle- or 
high-wage jobs are available to recent graduates; they may be harmed by a struggling 
local labor market. For schools that send most of their students into jobs nearby, the 
availability of middle- and upper-income job opportunities will clearly impact on 
outcomes. We have already seen that Las Vegas was hit hard by the recession, and 
especially in the middle of the wage distribution. The data we draw on in this report 
measures adult earnings measured in 2014. Persistently low middle-class wage growth in 
Las Vegas through 2016 has therefore almost certainly likely made it more difficult for 
students who stay local after leaving college to secure a higher position on the income 
ladder: important context for the mobility performance of local colleges. 
 
Conclusion 
Building a stronger middle class is a priority for the nation. This work must be done not 
just nationally, but by metros and institutions—not least, colleges. This is especially true 
in cities like Las Vegas, where middle class workers were hit hardest by the recession. The 
role of colleges in serving students from middle class backgrounds has been 
overshadowed in policy debates by a focus on students from poor families, and on 
mobility to the top rung of the income ladder. In this paper we construct new measures 
of middle-class college mobility, using institutions in the Mountain West by way of 
illustration and motivation. Most of these colleges help middle class students move up 
the economic ladder, or at least protect them against downward mobility. But there are 
differences by institution in terms of both access rates for middle class students and their 
average outcomes. The Nevada universities are among the cluster of institutions within 
the Mountain West with higher mobility rates, with UNLV enrolling more students from 
the middle class. 
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Appendix: Methodology 
Section 1 
Data sources. Data in the first section of this report are drawn from the public-use 
versions of the 2000 decennial census and the 2005-2017 American Community Survey 
(ACS), downloaded from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) versions 
provided by the University of Minnesota. 
Income. Household income is the sum of self-reported, pre-tax money income received 
by all household members ages 15 and older. This includes labor earnings, self-
employment income (net of business expenses), interest and dividends, income from 
estates and trusts, net rental income, Social Security, Supplemental Security Income, 
public assistance, pensions, unemployment compensation, child support, alimony, and 
any other regular sources of cash income. It does not include capital gains or in-kind (non-
cash) transfers. 
Household size. Income is adjusted for household size to reflect that, for example, a single 
individual living off of $50,000 is materially better off than a four-person household with 
the same income. This adjustment also helps to reflect that declining household sizes have 
eased the pressure on the average household’s budget. We use a square root equivalence 
scale to adjust for household size. This means that we divide income by the square root 
of the number of people in the household, which allows for “economies of scale” in 
household consumption. We multiply all households’ incomes by the square root of three 
in order to express income in household-of-three equivalents. 
Inflation. Incomes are adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban 
Consumers (CPI-U). Inflation adjustment will not impact the assignment of households to 
different income groups within a given survey year. It will, however, impact comparisons 
of median income. 
The 2000 census collected data on household income received in the calendar year 1999. 
We thus assign income reported in the 2000 census to the calendar year 1999. The ACS is 
conducted every month and asks respondents about to report income received during the 
previous 12 months. This means that respondents interviewed at the beginning of 2017 
reported income earned in calendar year 2016, whereas those interviewed at the end of 
2017 reported income earned in calendar year 2017. Because income reported in the ACS 
spans the survey year as well as the previous year, we adjust for inflation in the ACS using 
the average CPI-U across these two years. 
All income is reported in 2016-17 dollars.  
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Metropolitan areas. Metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), delineated by the U.S. Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB), consist of a county or counties that are associated 
with at least one urbanized area of at least 50,000 people, plus adjacent counties that 
have “a high degree of social and economic integration with the core as measured 
through commuting ties” (Census Bureau).23 To compare MSAs across time, we use the 
IPUMS variable MET2013, which identifies metro areas using the 2013 OMB delineations. 
MET2013 is available only for the survey years 2000 and 2005-2017. 
Regional prices. Regional Price Parities (RPPs)24 published by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis measure price levels in metropolitan areas as a percentage of the overall national 
price level. RPPs are available only from 2008 to 2016, so we do not adjust for regional 
differences in price levels in our main analysis, which relies on income data from 1999 to 
2017. Since price levels in Las Vegas are very close to national price levels (at 97.8% of 
national prices in 2016, down slightly from 100.9 in 2008), adjusting for regional price 
differences would not have a large impact on the share of Las Vegas households who are 
part of the national middle class.  
Definitions of the middle class. We should note a few differences between our 
application of Pew’s definition and Pew’s own reports on the middle class in metropolitan 
areas from 201625 and 2018.26 Note that these reports show that the size of the middle 
class dropped from 59.7 percent in 1999 to 55.5 percent in 2016 (the latest year available 
at the time), compared to our own estimates of 57 percent in 1999 to 51.4 percent in 
2015. 
First, Pew’s researchers adjust income for differences in the cost of living across 
metropolitan areas using Regional Price Parities (RPPs) from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, described above. Since RPPs are only available from 2008 to 2016, and our 
analysis extends from 1999 to 2017, we do not adjust for differences in the cost of living 
across metropolitan areas. For comparison, however, if we apply the 2016 RPP for Las 
Vegas to all years of data, we find that the share of Las Vegas households in the middle 
class has declined from 56.8 to 52 percent. 
Second, Pew describes the size of the middle class in terms of the share of adults living in 
middle-income households, rather than the share of households in the middle class. Using 
our RPP-adjusted estimate, the share of adults in Las Vegas who are middle class declined 
from 59.4 percent in 1999 to 55.5 percent in 2017. The slight difference between our 
estimate for 1999 and Pew’s can be explained by the fact that we use the 2016 RPP to 
adjust for the cost of living in 1999, while Pew uses the 2013 RPP. 
Kernel density. Kernel density estimation is used to estimate a probability density 
function for a population based on a data sample. This is similar to a histogram in that 
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observations are “binned” along the x-axis, and the height of the bars (or, in the case of 
kernel density estimates, the height of the curve) indicates the frequency with which 
observations appear in that bin relative to other bins. Larger bin widths result in smoother 
curves. The total area under each curve sums to 1; the area under a portion of the curve 
between two values on the x-axis (for instance, the shaded area representing the middle 
class) is the estimated fraction of the population within that range. We estimate the 
income distribution in Las Vegas using the Epanechnikov kernel with a bin width of $4,300. 
Section 2 
We use publicly released data from Chetty et al. (2017) on the cohort of college students 
who were born in 1980-1982 and attended college between the ages of 19 and 22 in the 
early 2000s. Parental income is measured as average annual household total income 
before taxes and transfers over the five years when the student turned 15-19. Students’ 
income as adults is measured as individual labor earnings in 2014, when the relevant 
cohort was between the ages of 32 and 34. Parents’ percentile ranks are generated by 
ranking parents based on their incomes relative to other parents with children in the same 
birth cohort. Students’ percentile ranks are generated by ranking students based on their 
earnings relative to others in their birth cohort. 
Students are assigned to the college they attended most frequently during the calendar 
years when they turned 19 to 22. If a student attended a community college for the first 
two years and then transferred to a four-year school for the remaining two, they would 
be assigned to the first college attended (the community college).  
This analysis will not capture older cohorts of students who attended these institutions 
during the same time period. This will likely have an outsized impact on two-year, less-
than-two-year, and for-profit schools, where many students are beyond the age of 22. 
We generate our measure of the average number of quintiles moved as follows. We use 
existing measures of the number of students at the college in the given cohort (measured 
as the average cohort size for the 1980-82 cohorts) and the share of students from each 
quintile in order to calculate the number of students in each quintile. We multiply the 
number of students in each quintile by the share of students within that quintile who end 
up in each of the other quintiles to obtain the number of students within each quintile 
who move up or down a given number of quintiles. For example, suppose we know that 
100 students at a given college come from the second quintile, and that 20% of them end 
up in the top quintile. We can then say that 20 students from the second quintile move 
up by 3 quintiles. 
To obtain the overall number of students at the college who move up or down a given 
number of quintiles, we simply sum across each parental quintile. For example, if 20 
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students from Q2 and 15 students from Q1 move up by 3 quintiles, then 35 students at 
the college move up by 3 quintiles. (Students from Q3 and beyond cannot move up by 3 
quintiles.) We then take the weighted average across all students, where the weight is 
equal to the positive or negative number of quintiles moved. For example, the number of 
students who move down by 2 quintiles is multiplied by -2, the number who remain in 
place is multiplied by 0, the number who move up by 3 quintiles is multiplied by 3, and so 
on. If 200 students at a college move up by 2 quintiles, 400 move up by 1 quintile, 300 
remain in place, and 100 move down 1 quintile, then the average number of quintiles 
moved is 0.7: 
2(200)+1(400)+0(300)−1(100)
200+400+300+100
 = 0.7 
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